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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
MD Mall Associates, L.L.C. (“MD Mall”), appeals 
from the summary judgment entered against it by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
on MD Mall‟s claims that CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”), 
a railroad, is liable for storm water flooding MD Mall‟s 
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property.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the 
District Court‟s grant of summary judgment, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Background
1
 
 
A. The Runoff Problem 
 
MD Mall owns and operates the MacDade Mall (the 
“Mall”) located in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.  The Mall 
is bounded on the south by a single railroad track owned by 
CSX, and, interestingly enough, on the east by South Avenue.  
CSX‟s property consists of the track and two drainage 
ditches, one running along either side of the track.  Houses 
located to the south of the track are at a higher elevation than 
the track, and the track is at a higher elevation than the Mall.  
CSX‟s predecessor in interest designed and installed an 
earthen berm on the north side of the track to prevent storm 
water from flowing downhill onto the property occupied by 
the Mall.  The berm straddles the property line of the Mall 
and the railroad, with the north side of it sloping down into 
the parking lot.  The Mall claims ownership of that slope up 
to the crest of the berm.   
                                              
1
 In accordance with our standard of review, see infra 
note 6, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 
MD Mall.  See Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012) (“When reviewing a grant 
of summary judgment the court must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party‟s favor.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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For many years after being built, the berm prevented 
storm water from discharging onto MD Mall‟s property.  In 
October 2010, however, storm water breached the berm at a 
spot near South Avenue, allowing water runoff and debris 
from CSX‟s property to flow down the slope and overwhelm 
a private storm water inlet located in the Mall parking lot.  An 
MD Mall representative sent two letters, dated October 29, 
2010, and January 13, 2011, asking CSX to contact him to 
discuss a resolution to the runoff problem.  In response, 
CSX‟s road master responsible for that portion of the track 
inspected the site.  Based on the road master‟s findings, a 
CSX engineer wrote in an internal memorandum that, 
“[i]nstead of the water flowing over the crossing [at South 
Avenue] and down the road towards the storm drains, it is not 
reaching the crossing and [is] instead running towards the 
[Mall] property.”  (App. at 56.)  The engineer proposed that 
CSX dig a “[d]itch” on CSX property “along the area and 
block the hill leading to the property, allowing the water to 
flow into the road and down to [a public] storm drain.”  (App. 
at 56.)  He also raised the possibility of installing a culvert 
under South Avenue to send the water to a nearby stream.  In 
an email dated January 20, 2011, the engineer notified MD 
Mall that CSX intended to implement the first option, which 
was less costly, and that it would complete the project “in a 
timely fashion.”  (App. at 57.) 
 
Despite that assurance, CSX did not go forward with 
that plan.  Instead, it began constructing a concrete spillway 
on the Mall‟s side of the berm to direct CSX‟s storm water 
into the Mall‟s private drainage inlet.  CSX workers cleared 
out a channel on the berm and set up wooden forms to create 
the spillway, all of which MD Mall asserts was done without 
its consent, while CSX claims that MD Mall had consented to 
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the installation in order to stop mud and debris from entering 
the Mall property.   
 
Whether or not there had been consent, when the 
Mall‟s manager discovered what CSX was doing, he 
immediately halted the work, demanding that the wooden 
forms be removed and that the Mall‟s side of the berm be 
restored to its original grade.  CSX agreed to halt construction 
of the spillway, but requested permission to install riprap in 
the cleared out channel.  MD Mall granted consent in writing 
but insisted that CSX provide a permanent solution to the 
runoff problem.  When CSX was not forthcoming with a 
permanent solution, MD Mall filed the present suit, invoking 
diversity jurisdiction in the District Court. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
MD Mall brought claims of negligence (Count I) and 
continuing storm water trespass (Count II) against CSX for 
“failing to properly maintain CSX‟s property so as to prevent 
water on CSX‟s property from flowing over onto [MD 
Mall‟s] property and causing damage … .”2  (App. at 122.)  
Although it initially sought “compensatory and consequential 
damages … , together with prejudgment interest and costs” 
(App. at 123), MD Mall later dropped its demand for 
                                              
2
 MD Mall also brought a separate trespass claim 
(Count III) against CSX for entering the Mall‟s property 
without permission to build the concrete spillway on the 
Mall‟s side of the berm.  After the District Court granted 
summary judgment to CSX on Counts I and II but denied 
summary judgment on Count III, MD Mall withdrew Count 
III. 
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damages and sought only injunctive relief that would require 
CSX to remedy the runoff problem.   
 
Both parties moved for summary judgment.  MD Mall 
had learned during discovery that, in March 2009, CSX had 
refurbished the relevant portion of the track, deploying 
approximately 30 pieces of heavy equipment to replace 325 
railroad ties.  Based on that information, MD Mall argued in 
its motion for summary judgment that the “substantial 
modifications to the tracks‟ drainage system” in 2009 “led to 
the discharge of CSX‟s water run-off onto the Mall Property 
and the noticeably deep property erosion by fall 2010.”  
(Supplemental App. at 80.)  For support, MD Mall cited the 
deposition testimony of its expert, Dr. Frank X. Browne, who 
identified the source of the water problem as CSX‟s 2009 
alteration of the drainage system and the hydrological 
condition of the property.  MD Mall also asserted that, for 
five years, CSX had failed to clear out the ditch adjacent to 
the berm.   
 
The fact that storm water had discharged from CSX‟s 
property onto MD Mall‟s property was evidence, according to 
MD Mall, that CSX had violated a federal regulation enacted 
pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act (the “FRSA” or 
the “Act”), which “require[s] that CSX manage and control 
the stormwater occurring on its property.”  (Supplemental 
App. at 90.)  That regulation provides that “[e]ach drainage or 
other water carrying facility under or immediately adjacent to 
the roadbed shall be maintained and kept free of obstruction, 
to accommodate expected water flow for the area concerned.”  
49 C.F.R. 213.33.  MD Mall argued that § 213.33 imposed on 
CSX a duty to ensure that the earthen berm system that was 
designed to prevent water from flowing onto the Mall 
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property is properly maintained.  (Supplemental App. at 90.)  
Given the erosion of the berm and the consequent flooding, 
MD Mall continued, “CSX is clearly not accommodating the 
expected water flow from its property, as required under 
Section 213.33.”3  (Supplemental App. at 90.)  As relief, MD 
Mall requested that “CSX be ordered to control and manage 
the water run-off occurring on its property pursuant to a full 
engineering plan.”  (Supplemental App. at 91.) 
 
Despite invoking § 213.33, MD Mall asserted that its 
claims were not preempted by the FRSA, even though that 
Act expressly provides that “[a] state may adopt or continue 
in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety 
… until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to 
railroad safety matters) … prescribes a regulation or issues an 
order covering the subject matter of the State requirement.”  
49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).  In support of its position, MD Mall 
cited a 2007 amendment to that preemption provision, which 
serves as a “[c]larification regarding State law causes of 
action.”  49 U.S.C. § 20106 (the “Clarification Amendment” 
or the “Amendment”).  The Clarification Amendment 
provides that “[n]othing in [the FRSA] shall be construed to 
preempt an action under State law seeking damages for 
personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a 
party … has failed to comply with the Federal standard of 
care established by a regulation or order issued by the 
                                              
3
 See also MD Mall‟s Supplemental Mem. in Opp‟n to 
CSX‟s Motion for Summ. J. at 6 (arguing that the “clear 
mandate” of § 213.33 is that CSX must “manage the 
stormwater on its property so that it is not discharged on to 
the Mall property in a concentrated and increased way”). 
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Secretary of Transportation.”  Id.  MD Mall argued that, 
under the Amendment, its claims were not preempted.   
 
The District Court saw things differently.  It granted 
CSX‟s cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that MD 
Mall‟s claims were blocked by the express preemption 
provision of the FRSA.  Because MD Mall had asserted that 
CSX was in violation of § 213.33, the District Court held that 
MD Mall had “implicitly acknowledge[d]” that the regulation 
is applicable to its claims (App. at 7), and the Court then 
determined that the claims were preempted.
4
 
 
The District Court rejected MD Mall‟s argument that 
its negligence and continuing storm water trespass claims 
were subject to the Clarification Amendment.  While state 
law actions are permitted to proceed when they allege a 
failure to comply with a federal standard of care, the Court 
held that the Amendment is limited to cases “„seeking 
damages for personal injury, death, or property damage.‟”  
(App. at 8 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)).)  Because MD 
Mall “appears to have disavowed any claim for damages and 
is instead seeking only equitable relief,” the Court determined 
that the Amendment did not apply.
5
  (App. at 8.) 
                                              
4
 The District Court mentioned that another regulation, 
49 C.F.R. § 213.103, relates to MD Mall‟s claims.  Section 
213.103 requires railroad tracks to be supported by material 
that will, among other things, “[p]rovide adequate drainage 
for the track.”  Id. § 213.103(c). 
5
 Because the District Court concluded that MD Mall‟s 
claims were preempted by the FRSA, it declined to address 
CSX‟s alternative argument that the claims were preempted 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act 
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MD Mall then filed this timely appeal.   
 
II. Discussion
6
 
 
A. Waiver and Judicial Estoppel 
 
MD Mall has now discarded its previous position that 
§ 213.33 sets the pertinent standard for measuring CSX‟s 
liability.  It argues instead that the regulation “[does] not even 
relate to, let alone cover, a railroad‟s discharge of stormwater 
onto an adjoining property.”  (MD Mall‟s Opening Br. at 11.)  
Because MD Mall raises that argument for the first time on 
appeal, CSX asserts that we should not consider it, as MD 
                                                                                                     
(the “ICCTA”).  It also declined to evaluate the underlying 
substantive merits of MD Mall‟s state law negligence and 
storm water trespass claims. 
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
“review [the] District Court‟s grant of summary judgment de 
novo, applying the same standard the District Court applied.”  
Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 
257 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Summary judgment is proper only where the pleadings, 
discovery, and non-conclusory affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
56(c).  As earlier noted, supra note 1, when reviewing a grant 
of summary judgment we “must view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party,” in this case MD 
Mall, “and draw all inferences in that party‟s favor.”  
Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Mall either waived it or is judicially estopped from raising it 
now.  We thus begin by addressing waiver and estoppel. 
 
 1. Waiver 
 
Arguments that are “asserted for the first time on 
appeal are deemed to be waived and consequently are not 
susceptible to review … absent exceptional circumstances.”  
Birdman v. Office of the Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 173 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, 
“[w]hile waiver ordinarily bars raising new arguments for the 
first time on appeal, this rule is one of discretion rather than 
jurisdiction, and it may be relaxed whenever the public 
interest so warrants.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 
F.3d 822, 834-35 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration, citations, and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Webb v. City of 
Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009) (waiver rule may be 
relaxed “where the issue‟s resolution is of public importance” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  CSX acknowledges that 
this case is of public importance; it argues that MD Mall‟s 
claims, if allowed, could subject it and other railroads to 
similar claims by myriad other landowners with property near 
railroad tracks.  Conversely, if MD Mall‟s claims are 
preempted, property owners may have no remedy for the 
discharge of storm water onto their land by a neighboring 
railroad.  Either way, MD Mall‟s claims are of public 
importance, and we accordingly decline to apply the general 
rule of waiver in this case. 
 
 2. Judicial Estoppel 
 
CSX also contends that MD Mall is judicially estopped 
from claiming that § 213.33 does not cover its claims.  
 11 
 
“Judicial estoppel is a judge-made doctrine that seeks to 
prevent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent with 
one that [it] has previously asserted in the same or in a 
previous proceeding.”  Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 
F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “The doctrine exists to protect the integrity of the 
judicial process and to prohibit parties from deliberately 
changing positions according to the exigencies of the 
moment.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  That said, 
“we have consistently stated that the doctrine should only be 
applied to avoid a miscarriage of justice.”  Krystal Cadillac-
Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 
314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
“[T]hree factors inform a federal court‟s decision 
whether to apply” judicial estoppel: “there must be (1) 
irreconcilably inconsistent positions; (2) adopted in bad faith; 
and (3) a showing that estoppel addresses the harm and no 
lesser sanction is sufficient.”  G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance 
Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (alterations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  However, “judicial 
estoppel is generally not appropriate where the defending 
party did not convince the District Court to accept its earlier 
position.”  Id.  CSX insists that MD Mall did convince the 
Court to accept its earlier position, because “the court did 
accept the Mall‟s „implicit[] acknowledg[ment]‟ that „the 
drainage regulation „covers‟ the subject of drainage‟ in the 
areas implicated by this case.”  (CSX‟s Br. at 22 (quoting 
App. at 7).) 
 
As MD Mall correctly points out, however, the District 
Court‟s citation of MD Mall‟s acknowledgment that § 213.33 
covers its claims does not rise to the level of reliance 
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necessary to trigger judicial estoppel.  Before determining 
that judicial estoppel bars relief, “courts regularly inquire 
whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to 
accept that party‟s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance 
of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create 
the perception that either the first or the second court was 
misled.”  New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Because judicial estoppel 
“generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a 
case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory 
argument to prevail in another phase,” id. at 749 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), “[a]bsent success in a prior 
proceeding, a party‟s later inconsistent position introduces no 
risk of inconsistent court determinations and thus poses little 
threat to judicial integrity,” id. at 750-51 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Judicial estoppel thus does not apply here because MD 
Mall did not obtain a benefit from the arguments it made in 
the District Court.  The arguments it made did not prevail in 
any meaningful sense.  The District Court instead granted 
summary judgment to CSX.  In the decisions that CSX cites 
to support its judicial estoppel argument, by contrast, judicial 
estoppel was found to bar relief because each estopped party 
had obtained an unfair litigation benefit as a result of its prior 
contradictory position.  See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751-
52 (state barred from changing the location of a boundary to 
which it had agreed in a prior consent order approved by the 
court); Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 273-74 (plaintiff barred from 
seeking reinstatement to his former job when he had accepted 
disability benefits based on a purported inability to work); 
Krystal, 337 F.3d at 320 (debtor estopped from asserting 
claim which he failed reveal to creditors so as to keep the 
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recovery on the claim for himself).  The doctrine of judicial 
estoppel “should only be applied to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice.”  Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319.  In this case, MD Mall did 
not benefit from its inconsistent position in the District Court, 
and no miscarriage of justice would result from our 
entertaining the argument it now advances on appeal.  Thus, 
while we have no desire to encourage the kind of head-
snapping inconsistency manifested in MD Mall‟s arguments, 
we decline to treat its new argument as judicially estopped. 
 
B. Express Preemption Under the FRSA 
 
As already noted, the FRSA provides that a state “law, 
regulation, or order related to railroad safety” shall be 
preempted by a regulation or order issued by “the Secretary 
of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters)” 
that “cover[s] the subject matter of the State requirement.”  49 
U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).  Pursuant to the previously described 
2007 Clarification Amendment to that express preemption 
provision, even though a federal regulation “covers” a state 
law related to railroad safety, a plaintiff may still bring claims 
“seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property 
damage” when the plaintiff “alleg[es] that a party … has 
failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established 
by a regulation or order issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation.”  Id. § 20106(b)(A) (2007).   
 
In Zimmerman v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 706 F.3d 
170 (3d Cir. 2013), we explained that, under the Clarification 
Amendment, “claimants can avoid preemption by alleging a 
violation of either a „Federal standard of care‟ or the 
railroad‟s „own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant 
to a regulation or order.‟”  Id. at 177 (quoting 49 U.S.C. 
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§ 20106(b)(1)(A)-(B)).  The Amendment “restricts 
preemption in some respects,” id., by clarifying that a claim is 
permitted when the allegation is that the railroad did not 
comply with the standard established by a federal regulation 
(traveling at 90 m.p.h, for example, despite a regulation 
limiting train speeds to 60 m.p.h.), “even when [the] 
regulation covers the subject matter of [the] claim,” id.  The 
Clarification Amendment also “preserves cases interpreting 
the phrase „covering the subject matter of the State 
requirement,‟” so that the well-developed law indulging a 
presumption against preemption, as further described herein, 
remains intact.  Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2)).   
 
Zimmerman calls for us to follow a two-step process: 
“We first ask whether the defendant allegedly violated either 
a federal standard of care or an internal rule that was created 
pursuant to a federal regulation.”  Id. at 178.  If so, as was the 
case in Zimmerman, “the plaintiff‟s claim avoids 
preemption.”  Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A)-(B)).  If 
not, we ask the second question, which is “whether any 
federal regulation covers the plaintiff‟s claim.”  Id. (citing 49 
U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2)).
7
 
                                              
7
 The universe of possible claims can be thought of as 
fitting within three categories: first, those, like the ones in 
Zimmerman, that depend upon the breach of a standard set by 
federal law (or adopted by a railroad from federal law) as the 
basis of liability and are thus not preempted; second, those 
that depend on state law as the basis for liability but which 
are preempted because there is an applicable FRSA regulation 
that entirely covers the plaintiff‟s claim; and, third, those that 
depend on state law and are not preempted because there is no 
such regulation.  The first Zimmerman question seeks to 
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This case is different from Zimmerman in that, on 
appeal, MD Mall has abandoned the argument that CSX 
violated a federal standard of care and instead insists that the 
pertinent federal regulation, § 213.33, does not cover a storm 
water discharge dispute of the type before us now.  (MD 
Mall‟s Opening Br. at 11.)  Thus, MD Mall‟s claims are only 
preserved from preemption if no federal regulation enacted 
pursuant to the FRSA “cover[s] the subject matter [i.e. storm 
water runoff] of the State requirement.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106(a)(2).
8
 
                                                                                                     
discover which claims fall within the first category, and the 
second Zimmerman question brings to light the claims that 
fall within the latter two categories. 
8
 Although MD Mall has abandoned its argument 
under the Clarification Amendment and we therefore need not 
evaluate whether the Amendment applies here, it did argue in 
the District Court, as already described, that § 213.33 
“require[s] that CSX manage and control the stormwater 
occurring on its property” (Supplemental App. at 90), and that 
CSX breached that duty through negligence during the 2009 
track refurbishment.  It said that it was therefore authorized to 
bring suit under the Clarification Amendment.  The District 
Court held, however, that the Clarification Amendment only 
saves from preemption state law actions that “seek[] damages 
for personal injury, death, or property damage.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106(b)(1).  The Court read the Amendment‟s silence on 
equitable relief as precluding MD Mall‟s request for an 
injunction.  That conclusion is open to question. 
The Clarification Amendment was a pinpoint piece of 
legislation meant to overturn federal court decisions in the so-
called “Minot Derailment Cases.”  Those cases, which 
 16 
 
                                                                                                     
involved the horrifying derailment near Minot, North Dakota, 
of tank cars carrying toxic chemicals, interpreted the FRSA to 
preempt claims for damages, even when a plaintiff alleged 
that a railroad violated federal regulations or its own internal 
rules.  See Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F. Supp. 
2d 1006, 1009 (D. Minn. 2007); Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 
Ltd., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1106 (D.N.D. 2006).  According 
to its legislative history, the Amendment was intended to 
“clarify the intent and interpretations of the existing 
preemption statute and to rectify the Federal court decisions 
related to the Minot, North Dakota accident that are in 
conflict with precedent.”  H.R. Rep. No. 110-259, at 351, 120 
Cong. Rec. H8589 (2007), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
2007, p. 119 (emphasis added).  To further hammer home its 
dissatisfaction with the Minot Derailment Cases, Congress 
applied the Amendment to “all pending State law causes of 
action arising from activities or events occurring on or after 
January 18, 2002,” the exact date of the Minot derailment.  
Id.; see also Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 
1214 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that Congress enacted the 
Amendment to rectify Minot Derailment Cases); Kurns v. 
Chesterton, No. 08-2216, 2009 WL 249769, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 3, 2009) (“[T]he amendments were clearly directed at 
the Minot, North Dakota, train derailment occurring on 
January 18, 2002.”). 
Aimed as it was at the specific difficulty Congress 
perceived in the Minot Derailment Cases, the Clarification 
Amendment speaks only about claims for damages, but that 
does not mean that suits for injunctive relief are beyond its 
clarifying effect.  Congress used the word “clarification,” 
which “indicates [it] sought to resolve an ambiguity rather 
than effect a substantive change” in railroad liability under 
 17 
 
When interpreting the FRSA‟s preemption provisions, 
we apply a general “presumption against preemption.”  
Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 240.  “In areas of traditional state 
regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not 
supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an 
intention „clear and manifest.‟”  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “The presumption is relevant even when there is an 
express pre-emption clause.  That is because „when the text of 
a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible 
reading, courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors 
pre-emption.‟  Thus, the presumption operates both to prevent 
and to limit preemption.”  Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Altria 
Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also N.Y. Susquehanna & W. 
Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] 
federal law does not preempt state laws where the activity 
regulated by the state is merely a peripheral concern of the 
federal law … .” (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  In the end, preemption applies only if it “is the 
                                                                                                     
the FRSA.  Henning, 530 F.3d at 1216.  Accordingly, the 
Clarification Amendment indicates that “a state law cause of 
action is not preempted when it is based on an allegation that 
a party failed to comply with a federal standard of care 
established by regulation or failed to comply with its own 
plan, rule or standard created pursuant to a federal 
regulation.”  Gauthier v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 644 F. Supp. 
2d 824, 835 (E.D. Tex. 2009).  A reading of the Clarification 
Amendment that leaves claims for injunctive relief preempted 
is not something we need to address now, but we note some 
difficulty with the District Court‟s reasoning. 
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clear and manifest purpose of Congress” in enacting the law 
in question, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 
664 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), because “the 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-
emption case,” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Beyond those general principles, the Supreme Court 
has determined that the FRSA‟s preemption provision 
“displays considerable solicitude for state law.”  Easterwood, 
507 U.S. at 665.  For example, Congress enacted the FRSA 
“to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and 
reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents,” 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20101, and the Secretary of Transportation has authority to 
“prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of 
railroad safety,” id. § 20103(a), but the preemptive effect of 
the statute reaches only state laws “covered” by the statute‟s 
implementing regulations.  Id. § 20106(a)(2).  Because the 
term “cover” is a “restrictive term,” preemption will not apply 
if the FRSA regulation in question merely “touch[es] upon or 
relate[s] to” the subject matter of state law.  Easterwood, 507 
U.S. at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, “pre-
emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially 
subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law.”  Id. 
 
We accordingly held in Strozyk v. Norfolk Southern 
Corp., 358 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2004), that a regulation‟s “bare 
mention of … limited visibility … does not indicate an intent 
to regulate [that] condition[],” and that a suit against a 
railroad alleging a condition of poor visibility at a railroad 
crossing was not preempted.  Id. at 273.  Other courts have 
likewise concluded that a federal regulation dictating that 
“[v]egetation on railroad property which is on or immediately 
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adjacent to [the] roadbed shall be controlled so that it does not 
… [o]bstruct visibility of railroad signs and signals,” 49 
C.F.R. § 213.37(b), serves to “preempt[] any state-law claim 
regarding vegetative growth that blocks a sign immediately 
adjacent to a crossing, but it does not impose a broader duty 
[under federal law] to control vegetation so that it does not 
obstruct a motorist‟s visibility of oncoming trains.”  Shanklin 
v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 369 F.3d 978, 987 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus a state law claim is 
not preempted if it alleges negligence in allowing vegetation 
to obscure safe lines of sight at a railroad crossing.  See, e.g., 
Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1003 
(W.D. Mo. 2006) (vegetation in crossing and right-of-way 
were not areas on or immediately adjacent to tracks and 
therefore claims that they obstructed sight lines were not 
preempted under the FRSA); Murrell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
544 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1154 (D. Or. 2008) (claims for failing 
to provide adequate visibility not preempted under the 
FRSA); Anderson v. Wis. Cent. Transp. Co., 327 F. Supp. 2d 
969, 979-80 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (claims of vegetation beyond 
the roadbed or immediately adjacent to it not preempted); cf. 
Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 516 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (sound capacity safety regulation addresses only 
the sound-producing capacity of the whistles and does not 
substantially subsume regulations on when whistles are 
sounded); Bradford v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 
831, 838-39 (W.D. Ark. 2007) (failure to keep proper lookout 
and crew fatigue not preempted because regulations merely 
touched upon the subject and did not subsume them). 
 
CSX argues that § 213.33, which by its terms requires 
that a railroad‟s drainage facilities “under or immediately 
adjacent to” the track “be maintained and kept free of 
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obstruction,” 49 C.F.R. § 213.33, preempts Pennsylvania law 
governing storm water runoff.  As the railroad sees it, MD 
Mall‟s claims must be dismissed because § 213.33 “cover[s] 
the subject of drainage under and around the tracks – and 
therefore preempt[s] the Mall‟s claims, which concern 
precisely the same topic.”9  (CSX‟s Br. at 18.)  Although it 
has acknowledged that the limited purpose of § 213.33 “is to 
keep water away from the tracks, that‟s it” (Supplemental 
App. at 133), CSX has nevertheless taken the aggressive 
position that the railroad is thereby permitted to channel its 
rainwater onto a neighboring property.  (See, e.g., 
Supplemental App. at 131 (“The railroad can do whatever it 
needs to do to keep water away … .”); id. at 133 
(“[Section 213.33] doesn‟t say, you can‟t put it on your – 
your neighbor‟s land, it doesn‟t say anything, it just says, 
keep it away from the tracks.”). 
 
We reject that conclusion.  First, to the extent CSX is 
saying that, as long as a regulation involves the same general 
topic as a plaintiff‟s claim, such as water drainage, the 
regulation “covers” that claim, the argument is at odds with 
Supreme Court precedent.  A regulation must do more than 
“touch upon or relate to [the] subject matter” of a state law 
                                              
9
 CSX also asserts that 49 C.F.R. § 213.103(c), which 
requires railroads to use ballast that “[p]rovide[s] adequate 
drainage for the track” (see supra n.4), serves with § 213.33 
to “cover the subject of drainage under and around the 
tracks.”  (CSX‟s Br. at 27-28.)  The railroad provides no 
argument, however, for how § 213.103 subsumes state storm 
water trespass law other than as a tag-along to § 213.33.  We 
therefore confine our analysis to CSX‟s arguments regarding 
§ 213.33. 
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claim; it must “substantially subsume” it.  Easterwood, 507 
U.S. at 664.  The railroad‟s argument for preemption here has 
even less to recommend it than the argument in Strozyk that a 
regulation requiring vegetation to be trimmed away from 
signs preempted a claim that overgrown vegetation created an 
unsafe crossing.  Stozyk, 358 F.3d at 273.  We cannot read the 
silence of § 213.33 on a railroad‟s duties to its neighbors 
when addressing track drainage as an express abrogation of 
state storm water trespass law.  Given that the FRSA provides 
no express authorization for disposing of drainage onto an 
adjoining property, the presumption must be that state laws 
regulating such action survive, see Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 
668 (noting that preemption is improper when “the 
regulations provide no affirmative indication of their effect on 
negligence law” (emphasis added)). 
 
Second, the type of harm sought to be avoided by 
§ 213.33 is wholly different than the harm alleged by MD 
Mall.  Several courts interpreting the Federal Employers 
Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, which protects 
railroad employees from railroad negligence,
10
 have held that 
                                              
10
 Although FELA is a federal statute and federal 
preemption “is inapplicable to a potential conflict between 
two federal statutes,” Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 
F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2006), there is a general consensus that 
“the uniformity demanded by the FRSA „can be achieved 
only if [FRSA regulations] are applied similarly to a FELA 
plaintiff‟s negligence claim and a non-railroad-employee 
plaintiff‟s state law negligence claim.‟”  Nickels v. Grand 
Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 560 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 443 (5th 
Cir. 2001)); see also id. (“Dissimilar treatment of the claims 
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“whether compliance with applicable FRSA safety 
regulations precludes a finding that a railroad has been 
negligent” depends in large part on whether the regulations in 
question “directly address[] the type of harm that ultimately 
resulted.”  Cowden v. BNSF Ry. Co., 738 F. Supp. 2d 932, 
937 (E.D. Mo. 2010); see also Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. 
Nichols Constr. Co., 574 F. Supp. 2d 590, 599 (E.D. La. 
2008) (“[T]he types of dangers and precautions contemplated 
by a railroad safety regulation are determinative of whether or 
not a railroad‟s compliance with regulations will shield it 
from liability.”).  If the regulations do address the type of 
harm alleged, “the compliance with [those] regulation[s] will 
preclude a finding of liability … .”  Cowden, 738 F. Supp. 2d 
at 937.  On the other hand, if a plaintiff‟s injuries “come 
about in a way not contemplated by a safety regulation, then 
the railroad‟s compliance with that regulation might not 
preclude its having failed to exercise a reasonable standard of 
care.”  Nichols Constr, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 599.  “Numerous 
courts have applied this general principle in finding that a 
                                                                                                     
would have the untenable result of making the railroad safety 
regulations established under the FRSA virtually 
meaningless: The railroad could at one time be in compliance 
with federal railroad safety standards with respect to certain 
classes of plaintiffs yet be found negligent under the FELA 
with respect to other classes of plaintiffs for the very same 
conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  As a result, 
courts apply the principles distilled by Easterwood and its 
progeny in determining whether a claim under FELA is 
substantially subsumed, and therefore precluded, by railroad 
safety regulations enacted pursuant to the FRSA, and we 
accordingly apply the reasoning of the FELA cases by 
analogy. 
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given FRSA regulation was or was not intended to prevent 
the harm the plaintiff suffered, and that the defendant 
railroad‟s duty of care accordingly was or was not subsumed 
by the regulation.”  Cowden, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 938.  
Compare Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 443 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (excessive-speed claim precluded by FRSA 
regulations concerning speed limits), with Tufariello v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
a railroad employee could bring a negligence claim against 
his employer for hearing loss resulting from long-term 
exposure to train horns because no FRSA preclusion existed, 
as the FRSA only prescribed minimum sound levels for 
warning devices on  trains). 
 
Section 213.33 is, by CSX‟s own admission, plainly 
intended to prevent water from pooling on or around railroad 
tracks and thus to avoid potentially dangerous conditions 
occasioned by standing water, such as the presence of debris 
on tracks, icing conditions, and compromised track integrity.  
There is no indication whatsoever that it was intended to 
address storm water discharge onto a neighboring property, 
which is the harm alleged by MD Mall.
11
  Again, CSX 
                                              
11
 The dissent claims that, in looking to the type of 
harm sought to be avoided by an FRSA regulation, we are 
flouting Easterwood‟s “unequivocal instruction” that, “in 
determining the preemptive effect of a regulation, the only 
question is whether the regulation covers the subject matter.”  
(Dissent Op. at 5 (citing Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664).)  As 
proof, the dissent points to a statement in Easterwood, made 
with reference to an FRSA regulation governing train speed, 
that the FRSA‟s preemption provision “does not … call for an 
inquiry into the Secretary‟s purposes, but instead directs the 
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courts to determine whether regulations have been adopted 
that in fact cover the subject matter of train speed.”  
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675.  By looking to the purpose 
behind an FRSA regulation, the dissent insists, “we divert our 
attention from the „coverage‟ of [§ 213.33],” and “we 
disregard the preemption analysis required under 
Easterwood.”  (Dissent Op. at 6.) 
Our colleague‟s reading of Easterwood is out of 
context.  When the Supreme Court made that statement, it had 
already established that the train speed regulation in question 
“should be understood as covering the subject matter of train 
speed with respect to track conditions, including the 
conditions posed by grade crossings.”  Easterwood, 507 U.S. 
at 675.  In other words, the harm sought to be avoided by the 
relevant regulation was the danger posed by fast moving 
trains.  The plaintiff below “nevertheless maintain[ed] that 
pre-emption is inappropriate because the Secretary‟s primary 
purpose in enacting the speed limits was not to ensure safety 
at grade crossings, but rather to prevent derailments.”  Id.  
Having already determined that the regulation covered “train 
speed” with respect to, among other things, “conditions posed 
by grade crossings,” the Court saw no justification for delving 
into the relative weight of the particular railroad safety 
concerns the Secretary had in mind when promulgating the 
regulation.  Id.   
Our dissenting colleague counters that “[t]he nature of 
the harm [addressed by a regulation] is … irrelevant in 
determining „coverage.‟”  (Dissent Op. at 6 n.7.)  That, 
however, denies that the purpose of a regulation bears on its 
scope.  We see nothing in Easterwood to support that 
extraordinary claim, which is contrary to ordinary rules of 
construction, in general, see Crandon v. United States, 494 
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U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of [a] 
statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, 
but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and 
policy.”), and to well-settled rules for evaluating the 
preemptive scope of federal statutes and regulations, in 
particular, see Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 76 (“Our inquiry into 
the scope of a statute‟s pre-emptive effect is guided by the 
rule that the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case.” (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
An analogy to § 213.33 brings clarity to the matter.  
Section 213.33 seeks to prevent harms associated with water 
pooling on or around railroad tracks – harms such as icing 
conditions, compromised track integrity, a greater likelihood 
of dangerous obstructions occasioned by standing water, and 
the like.  An allegation that such conditions led to an accident 
would be “covered” by § 213.33, regardless of whether the 
actual harm caused by the alleged condition was great (e.g. a 
train derailment) or relatively small (e.g. a slip and fall).  
Whether the Secretary had train derailments foremost in mind 
in promulgating § 213.33 is irrelevant, in other words, 
because the regulation seeks generally to avoid harms caused 
by an inadequately drained track. 
Related as it is to railroad safety – as it must be under 
49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) – § 213.33 does not seek to avoid the 
harms associated with a railroad‟s discharge of storm water 
onto an adjoining property.  Whether the railroad disposes of 
its runoff by channeling it to the public storm water system or 
to its neighbor‟s property is irrelevant to the regulation‟s 
railroad safety purpose.  And given that the regulation and the 
FRSA do not otherwise relieve railroads of their state law 
duties to their neighbors we are reluctant to hold that § 213.33 
 26 
 
pressed its understanding of § 213.33 at oral argument in the 
District Court, saying that § 213.33 “is a drainage regulation” 
that “essentially” tells railroads “to keep the water off the 
tracks because it‟s dangerous to have water there, because it 
will deteriorate the track.”  (Supplemental App. at 133.)  CSX 
represented that “the intent of” the drainage regulation “is to 
keep water away from the tracks, that‟s it.”  (Supplemental 
App. at 133.)  It is accordingly difficult to conclude that 
§ 213.33 “was … intended to prevent the harm plaintiff 
suffered,” i.e., storm water trespass, or “that the defendant 
railroad‟s duty of care” with respect to state storm water 
trespass law was “subsumed by the regulation.”  Cowden, 738 
F. Supp. 2d at 938 (citations omitted). 
 
Finally, the position advocated by CSX – that because 
§ 213.33 does not prohibit storm water discharge onto 
adjoining property it therefore permits it – is troubling 
because, as the Tenth Circuit said in Emerson v. Kansas City 
Southern Railway Co., 503 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2007), it “has 
no obvious limit, and[,] if adopted,” could “lead to absurd 
results.”  Id. at 1132.  Although Emerson interpreted a 
question of preemption under the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act (the “ICCTA”), the Tenth 
Circuit‟s observations about the limitless and absurd results 
occasioned by an expansive interpretation of an express 
preemption provision are pertinent here, especially in light of 
the FRSA‟s solicitude for state law.  See Easterwood, 507 
U.S. at 664 (noting that the FRSA‟s preemption provision 
“displays considerable solicitude for state law”). 
 
                                                                                                     
“covers” MD Mall‟s storm water discharge claims. 
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The plaintiffs in Emerson alleged that, when the 
defendant railroad replaced old, deteriorated rail ties, it 
“regularly discarded” the ties in a nearby drainage ditch.  
Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1128.  The ditch consequently became 
clogged, and the plaintiffs‟ property flooded.  Id.  The 
railroad argued that subjecting it to liability for discarding old 
rail ties would interfere with the ICCTA, which provides that 
“remedies … with respect to regulation of rail transportation 
are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under 
Federal or State law.”  49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).  The court 
rejected that argument, reasoning that “[i]f the ICCTA 
preempts a claim stemming from improperly dumped railroad 
ties, it is not a stretch to say that the Railroad could dispose of 
a dilapidated engine in the middle of Main Street – a cheap 
way to be rid of an unwanted rail car.”  Emerson, 503 F.3d at 
1132.  “After all,” the court continued, “in this hypothetical 
… the Railroad is merely disposing of unneeded railroad 
equipment in a cost-conscious fashion.  Our holding 
[rejecting the railroad‟s demand for sweeping preemption] … 
interprets the ICCTA‟s preemption clause such that this 
absurd result is avoided.”  Id. 
 
In line with that persuasive reasoning, we must take a 
sensible view of the FRSA‟s preemption provision, avoiding 
the carte blanche ruling the railroad seeks.  Longstanding 
state tort and property laws exist for a reason, and the FRSA‟s 
laudatory safety purpose should not be used as a cover to 
casually cast them aside.  See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 668 
(noting that preemption is improper when “the regulations 
provide no affirmative indication of their effect on negligence 
law”).  For if CSX is free to negligently discharge its storm 
water onto its neighbor‟s property, why should it not be 
allowed to do so intentionally?  It might simplify CSX‟s 
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duties under § 213.33 if it could simply install drainage pipes 
that empty directly onto adjoining properties.  Judging by the 
testimony of CSX‟s road master, who stated that CSX‟s sole 
concern when conducting the 2009 track refurbishment was 
to ensure that storm water drained away from the track and 
that it was not concerned about storm water discharging onto 
the adjoining property, and given CSX‟s argument in the 
District Court that § 213.33 allows a “railroad [to] do 
whatever it needs to do to keep water away” from the railroad 
track, including directing it onto a neighbor‟s property 
(Supplemental App. at 131, 133), and further given the 
attempt by the railroad in this case to build a spillway 
emptying directly into the Mall‟s storm drain, CSX‟s position 
is not far removed from that extreme.  The constrained scope 
given to the FRSA‟s preemption provision by the Supreme 
Court in Easterwood cannot support such an understanding of 
§ 213.33.
12
 
                                              
12
 The dissent characterizes our analysis as holding 
that, “even if [the] FRSA clearly covers the conduct of a 
railroad, such that the matter is preempted under Easterwood, 
a claimant could, nonetheless, assert a claim for any resulting 
or consequential injury that flows from the covered conduct.”  
(Dissent Op. at 4.)  Viewing our analysis in that way, the 
dissent claims that we “gut … preemption analysis” and 
“turn[] preemption on its head,” which “will bring about 
needless confusion in our jurisprudence as to the proper 
preemption analysis.”  (Id. at 9.)  Our opinion here does no 
such thing.  When a regulation covers (in that it substantially 
subsumes) a plaintiff‟s state law claims, the FRSA applies, 
and the suit will be preempted, assuming the Clarification 
Amendment does not revive it.  Our conclusion is that 
§ 213.33, which requires railroads to maintain systems that 
 29 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the FRSA‟s express 
preemption provision does not apply to MD Mall‟s claims. 
 
C. Implied Conflict Preemption 
 
Even though the FRSA‟s express preemption provision 
does not operate to extinguish MD Mall‟s claims, the present 
lawsuit may be “pre-empted by implication because the state-
law principle [it] seek[s] to vindicate would conflict with 
federal law.”  Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 
(1995).
13
  A court may find implied conflict pre-emption 
“where it is impossible for a private party to comply with 
both state and federal law,” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
                                                                                                     
adequately drain water away from the track, does not 
substantially subsume MD Mall‟s claims regarding water 
discharge onto their property, not that MD Mall‟s claims may 
proceed even though § 213.33 covers its claims. 
13
 The Court in Myrick rejected “the argument that [it] 
need not reach the conflict pre-emption issue at all” because 
“implied pre-emption cannot exist when Congress has chosen 
to include an express pre-emption clause in a statute.”  
Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287.  At the same time, however, the 
Court acknowledged that prior case law “supports an 
inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses 
implied pre-emption; [though] it does not establish a rule.”  
Id. at 289; see also id. at 288 (“The fact that an express 
definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute „implies‟ – i.e., 
supports a reasonable inference – that Congress did not intend 
to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express 
clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-
emption.”). 
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Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000), or “where under the 
circumstances of a particular case, the challenged state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. (alterations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  “What is a sufficient 
obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining 
the federal statute [or regulation] as a whole and identifying 
its purpose and intended effects … .”  Id.  “The mere fact of 
„tension‟ between federal and state law is generally not 
enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption, 
particularly when the state law involves the exercise of 
traditional police power.”  Madeira v. Affordable Housing 
Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006).  Rather, “[t]he 
principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the 
state of its police power, which would be valid if not 
superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the 
repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two 
acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.”  
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544 (1977) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Conflict preemption thus embraces two distinct 
situations.  In the easier but rarer case, compliance with both 
federal and state duties is simply impossible.  See, e.g., 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (state law 
requiring judicial determination of certain claims preempted 
by federal law requiring arbitration of those claims).  In the 
second and more common situation, compliance with both 
laws is possible, yet state law poses an obstacle to the full 
achievement of federal purposes. 
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We can confidently conclude that this case is not of the 
former variety.  As CSX‟s engineers suggested when studying 
the breakdown of the berm, the runoff problem is remediable, 
though at some cost to the company, and it is therefore not 
impossible for CSX to comply both with Pennsylvania storm 
water trespass law and § 213.33.  It would indeed be odd to 
conclude that dual compliance is not possible given that CSX 
successfully did just that for a number of decades without 
difficulty. 
 
We are less confident, however, in saying that 
Pennsylvania law does not, “under the circumstances of [this] 
particular case, … stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We do not know, because the 
District Court made no findings of fact, whether and to what 
extent, if any, Pennsylvania law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of § 213.33‟s railroad safety 
purpose.  Whether CSX can employ reasonable means to 
comply with § 213.33‟s drainage requirements in this specific 
case while also complying with Pennsylvania law regarding 
storm water trespass is a question of fact.  See Arizona v. 
United States, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
that “[i]t is impossible” to “„determine whether, under the 
circumstances of this particular case, [the State‟s] law stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress,” without “a factual 
record concerning the manner in which Arizona is 
implementing” state law); James T. O‟Reilly, Federal 
Preemption of State and Local Law: Legislation, Regulation 
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and Litigation 72 (2006) (stating that conflict preemption 
analysis “requires … attention to the facts of each case”).   
 
It may be that, in the maintenance of the drainage 
facilities that are under and immediately adjacent to the 
portion of the track in question, CSX is unable, through 
reasonable means, to prevent the flow of storm water onto 
MD Mall‟s property.  Again, since the railroad managed for 
years to deal with its drainage without affecting the Mall, one 
wonders how it can have become an unreasonable burden 
now, but we have virtually no factual record on the issue and 
so cannot definitively address it.  The District Court is in a 
better position to make the necessary factual inquiry, and we 
will therefore remand for the development of an appropriate 
record.
14
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 Of course, any analysis of conflict preemption 
requires an inquiry into the dictates of the state law in 
question, for if state law does not prohibit a railroad from 
discharging storm water onto an adjoining land under the 
circumstances of this case, there is no conflict of law.  
Because the District Court did not evaluate the underlying 
merits of MD Mall‟s storm water trespass or negligence 
claims, but rather avoided them on FRSA preemption 
grounds, on remand we will allow the District Court to have a 
first pass at those questions.  Cf. Strozyk, 358 F.3d at 278 
(reversing district court‟s preemption holding and “leav[ing] 
the issue of whether or not the railroad met its duty of care, 
and the relevant standard, for the District Court and the fact 
finder on remand”). 
In addition, we will leave it to the District Court on 
remand to address, if necessary, CSX‟s additional argument 
that MD Mall‟s claims are preempted under the ICCTA, the 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order granting summary judgment in CSX‟s favor, 
and will remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. 
Finally, given our invocation of the public importance 
exception to the waiver doctrine to allow MD Mall to press its 
new argument, MD Mall is estopped from arguing on remand 
that § 213.33 imposes a duty on CSX to prevent storm water 
discharge onto a neighboring property and that CSX failed to 
comply with the supposed standard of care created by that 
duty.  Otherwise, we would be allowing MD Mall for the 
third time to “assert[] a position inconsistent with one that [it] 
[had] previously asserted in … a previous proceeding.”  
Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I dissent from the majority’s opinion because I 
believe its analysis veers from Supreme Court precedent in 
the area of FRSA preemption.  When the Mall commenced 
this action in District Court complaining of CSX’s failure 
to maintain its stormwater drainage, it urged that, applying 
the ―coverage‖ test for preemption that the Supreme Court 
established in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 
U.S. 658 (1993), its claims were clearly covered by 49 
C.F.R. § 213.33.  Section 213.33 provides: 
 
Each drainage or other water carrying 
facility under or immediately adjacent to the 
roadbed shall be maintained and kept free of 
obstruction, to accommodate expected water 
flow for the area concerned. 
 
The Mall contended that, although the regulation covered 
the subject matter of its state law claims, the claims were 
not preempted because the Clarifying Amendment 
applied.
1
  That Amendment provides that FRSA does not 
                                              
1
 See, e.g., S.A. 98-99 (―Therefore, based upon the 
clarifying amendment, claims alleging that the railroad 
failed to comply with federal regulations are not preempted 
by the FRSA.‖) (emphasis added), S.A. 110-13, S.A. 160-
61, S.A. 165 (―We are suing under a state law that is 
 2 
 
preempt claims for damages if they allege a violation of a 
―[f]ederal standard of care‖ or the railroad’s ―own plan, 
rule, or standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or 
order.‖  49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A)-(B).   
 
The District Court agreed with the Mall that § 213.33 
covered the subject matter of the Mall’s state law claims, 
but held that the Clarifying Amendment did not apply 
because the Mall requested only injunctive relief—not 
damages.  Dissatisfied with this result, the Mall now comes 
to our Court with a new approach for gaining an 
injunction.   It now contends that § 213.33 does ―not even 
relate to, let alone cover, a railroad’s discharge of 
stormwater onto an adjoining property.‖  (Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 11.)  In other words, it argues the direct 
opposite of what it pleaded and consistently urged below.   
 
In furtherance of this epiphany, the Mall urges that 
CSX’s stormwater is not really a drainage issue that 
§ 213.33 regulates.  Rather, it contends that the stormwater 
should be viewed as ―flow‖ or ―runoff‖ onto an adjoining 
property.  The majority has embraced this argument.  I 
conclude, however, that the Mall was right the first time: 
§ 213.33 clearly covers the subject matter of its claims, and 
under Easterwood, that is the only issue that matters.  In 
Easterwood, the Supreme Court framed the critical 
preemption FRSA inquiry: does the regulation at issue 
―substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant 
state law[?]‖  507 U.S. at 664.  Here, it does.  The Mall’s 
position on appeal ignores Easterwood’s command, and is 
                                                                                                 
identical to federal regulations, they both say the same 
thing . . . thou shall maintain your water.‖). 
 3 
 
flawed from a physical, analytical, and practical 
standpoint.    
 
 First, an examination of the physical layout of the 
area reveals that the hillside leading to the Mall’s 
property—the site of the alleged negligence—is 
immediately adjacent to the roadbed.
2
  A picture tells a 
thousand words, and the photo attached to this opinion 
demonstrates the requisite proximity.
3
  Can there be any 
doubt that the regulation ―covers‖ the drainage in this area?  
I think not. 
 
 Second, analytically, the Mall’s own characterization 
of CSX’s misconduct belies its assertion that § 213.33 does 
not cover CSX’s conduct.  The Mall repeatedly and 
consistently articulates CSX’s conduct as its failure to 
                                              
2
 ―Roadbed‖ refers to ―the area under and adjacent to the 
tracks.‖  Anderson v. Wis. Cent. Transp. Co., 327 F. Supp. 
2d 969, 979 n.11 (E.D. Wis. 2004); accord Mo. Pac. R.R. 
v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 948 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1991).  
―Immediately adjacent‖ is ten to fifteen feet.  Anderson, 
237 F. Supp. 2d at 980; Hadley v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
No. Civ.A. 02–1901, 2003 WL 21406183, at *2 (E.D. La. 
June 16, 2003).   
3
 Ditch lines abut and run parallel to the roadbed.  When it 
rains, water flows from the roadbed into the ditches.  The 
Mall contends that the drainage problem is the result of 
CSX’s failure to maintain the ditch that borders the Mall’s 
property.  (A. 119 (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11).)  Although the 
parties do not provide the dimensions of the area, it is clear 
that the ditch line is immediately adjacent to the roadbed.    
 4 
 
manage the storm water on its property
4—exactly what 
§ 213.33 requires CSX to do.  According to the Mall and 
the majority, however, the fact that § 213.33 addresses the 
very conduct that the Mall contests does not matter in 
evaluating whether the regulation covers the subject matter 
of the Mall’s claims.  Rather, they contend that what 
matters is the result—here, runoff onto the Mall’s property.  
This position is captured in the Mall’s Complaint: the 
continuing trespass claim is the result of CSX’s ―failing to 
properly control its stormwater and maintain the CSX 
Property so that its stormwater does not overflow onto 
MacDade’s property.‖  (A. 123 (Compl. ¶ 30).)  But, the 
―flow‖ or ―runoff‖ onto the Mall’s property is not the 
negligent act complained of, it is the result.  If we were to 
adopt the majority’s position, we would be holding that 
even if FRSA clearly covers the conduct of a railroad, such 
that the matter is preempted under Easterwood, a claimant 
could, nonetheless, assert a claim for any resulting or 
consequential injury that flows from the covered conduct.  
                                              
4
 See Am. Compl. at A. 117, A. 121, A. 123; MD Mall’s 
Mem. of Law in Supp. of MD Mall’s Motion for Summ. J. 
at S.A. 71, S.A. 82, S.A. 90 (―CSX is clearly not 
accommodating the expected water flow from its property, 
as required under Section 213.33.‖), S.A. 91 (―CSX has 
failed to properly control its water run-off from illegally 
discharging on to [sic] the Mall Property.‖); MD Mall’s 
Response in Opp. to CSX’s Motion for Summ. J. at S.A. 
93-94 (―CSX should be managing its stormwater so that it 
drains without causing damage to the Mall property.‖), 
S.A. 99; Appellant’s Br. at 14, 29 (―[T]he stormwater 
problem arose on [CSX’s] property and it controls its 
property.‖); Appellant’s Reply Br. at 26.   
 5 
 
This position renders preemption toothless and cannot 
withstand analytic scrutiny.  Simply put, that CSX’s failure 
to comply with § 213.33 leads to a result that harms 
another is not a basis to ignore the preemptive effect of the 
regulation and permit a claim to be brought for that harm.
5
   
 
The Mall and the majority arrive at this conclusion by 
focusing on what they believe to be the intent of the 
regulation.  The majority reasons:  ―There is no indication 
whatsoever that it was intended to address storm water 
discharge onto a neighboring property, which is the harm 
alleged by MD Mall.‖ See Majority Op. at 23 (emphasis 
added).  However, this approach is directly contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s unequivocal instruction in Easterwood.  
There, the Supreme Court stated that in determining the 
preemptive effect of a regulation, the only question is 
whether the regulation covers the subject matter.  507 U.S. 
at 664.  The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the intent 
of the regulation was not to be considered: ―Section 4346 
does not, however, call for an inquiry into the Secretary’s 
purposes, but instead directs the courts to determine 
whether regulations have been adopted that in fact cover 
the subject matter of train speed.‖  Id. at 675.  Here, if we 
substituted ―storm water drainage adjacent to the roadbed‖ 
                                              
5
 If this were not the case, the Clarifying Amendment’s 
allowance of claims for resulting harm would have been 
unnecessary.  The Clarifying Amendment applies to claims 
for damages for actual harm, and the District Court 
correctly held that injunctive relief is not allowed.  That is 
the province of the Secretary of Transportation, as I note 
below.   
6
 Referring to FRSA’s preemption provision.   
 6 
 
for ―train speed‖, it is clear that the necessary ―coverage‖ 
exists.  The Secretary has adopted a regulation that 
explicitly addresses ―drainage . . . immediately adjacent to 
the roadbed,‖ and the Mall is claiming that under state law, 
CSX is negligent in how it handles its stormwater adjacent 
to the roadbed.  If we divert our attention from the 
―coverage‖ of this regulation—of which there can be no 
doubt here—we disregard the preemption analysis required 
under Easterwood.
7
 
                                              
7
 The majority’s reading of the analysis in Easterwood as 
concerned with the harm that the regulation was intended 
to prevent, see Majority Op. at 23 n.11, is incorrect.  
Easterwood involved an inquiry into whether a very 
specific regulation—setting train speed caps—should be 
read expansively to cover, i.e. subsume, the subject matter 
of train speed safety.  The Supreme Court was determining 
the scope of the regulation—not, as the majority posits, 
―the harm sought to be avoided by the relevant regulation.‖  
Majority Op. at 23 n.11.  These are different inquiries.  The 
Supreme Court adopted an expansive view of the scope of 
the regulation, based on an examination of what was 
considered in adopting the regulation—overall safety, not 
merely speed caps.  507 U.S. at 674-75.  Interestingly, 
however, the majority seems to agree with my view that 
once the Supreme Court in Easterwood concluded that the 
scope of the regulation was train speed safety, it held that it 
did not need to delve into the harms that the regulations 
were intended to avoid, namely derailments.  See Majority 
Op. at 23 n.11.  The nature of the harm is, therefore, 
irrelevant in determining ―coverage.‖  That leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that, here, once we have 
concluded that the scope of the regulation covers the 
 7 
 
The sparse case law discussing § 213.33 is consistent 
with this reasoning.  For example, in Rooney v. City of 
Philadelphia, property owners brought suit against 
AMTRAK alleging that runoff and drainage problems 
resulted in flooding that ―caus[ed] extensive damages to 
Plaintiffs’ properties and businesses.‖  623 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  The court concluded that FRSA 
regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 213.33, governed, 
among other things, ―[d]rainage requirements‖, and as a 
result, ―cover[ed] the subject matter at issue.‖  Id. at 666.  
In Black v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., plaintiffs 
initiated suit against the railroad alleging that ―pumping 
actions in low joints, lack of good crossties, ballast and 
poor drainage‖ created muddy conditions that were 
hazardous to trainmen.  398 N.E.2d 1361, 1362 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1980).  The court held that although there was no 
―specific regulation dealing with muddy conditions,‖ 
plaintiff’s claims were preempted because FRSA 
regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 213.33, covered the 
―conditions that are alleged to have contributed to the‖ 
muddy conditions.  Id. at 1363.  Recently, in Miller v. 
                                                                                                 
proper management of stormwater drainage adjacent to the 
roadbed—which is what the Mall contends is the cause of 
its problem—we should not consider the assertion that the 
regulation was aimed at the integrity of the tracks, not 
runoff.  Had Easterwood been decided along the lines that 
the Mall and the majority urge, the Court would have 
concluded that because the speed cap was aimed at 
preventing derailments, not collisions with automobiles at 
grade crossings, the claim would not be preempted.  As we 
know, that reasoning was not only not adopted by the 
Supreme Court—it was explicitly rejected. 
 8 
 
SEPTA, the court, citing the clear mandate of Easterwood, 
went so far as to conclude that a plaintiff’s claim was 
preempted under § 213.33 where the railroad’s poorly 
maintained railroad bridge obstructed the flow of a stream 
and caused the stream to flood the plaintiff’s property.  No. 
1876 C.D.2011, 2013 WL 830715 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 
7, 2013).  Here, we have a much clearer case of 
―coverage.‖  The Mall’s claims arise directly from an 
alleged drainage problem that is immediately adjacent to 
the tracks.
8
          
 
 Further, the Mall’s and the majority’s position that a 
court may dictate how a railroad handles its stormwater 
drainage runs afoul of FRSA’s statutory scheme.  FRSA 
states that the Secretary of Transportation has the 
―exclusive authority‖ to ―request an injunction for a 
violation of a railroad safety regulation.‖  49 U.S.C. 
                                              
8
 The majority does not cite one case that addresses 
§ 213.33.  In discussing whether the regulation ―covers‖ 
the subject matter of the Mall’s claims, the majority cites 
cases where the regulation ―merely touched upon‖ the 
subject matter of a plaintiff’s claims or cases that did not 
reach the issue in the fact pattern before this court.  The 
majority relies heavily on Emerson v. Kansas City 
Southern Railway Company, 503 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 
2007).  That case is inapposite.  There, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed ICCTA preemption—not 
FRSA preemption—and analyzed whether the ―regulation 
of rail transportation‖ covered the railroad’s discarding old 
railroad ties into a drainage ditch.  The issue of coverage is 
much clearer here, as § 213.33 actually regulates drainage.    
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§ 20111(a)(2).  The scope of the work to be done to 
remedy the condition at the CSX roadbed, berm, and 
adjacent hillside is the concern of the Secretary.  The 
proposition that a court should refrain from involving itself 
in that subject matter is what preemption is all about.  The 
consistency, uniformity, and safety concerns, that underlie 
these types of regulations should not be minimized or 
ignored. 
 
 Finally, from a practical perspective, there is no 
reason to gut our preemption analysis to provide the Mall 
with a remedy.  To the extent the Mall is actually harmed, 
the Mall could proceed under the Clarifying Amendment 
with a request for damages for any property damage that it 
suffers—as it did originally before limiting itself to 
injunctive relief.  The Mall could also bring the matter to 
the attention of the Secretary of Transportation, requesting 
that he issue an injunction that compels CSX to comply 
with § 213.33.   
 
For the foregoing reasons I believe that the Mall’s 
position, which the majority adopts, is flawed.  The most 
important reason, however, is that it runs afoul of 
Easterwood’s holding that the key question is whether the 
regulations ―substantially subsume the subject matter‖ of 
the relevant state law.  Here, § 213.33 does just that.  
Easterwood is very clear, but the majority’s holding turns 
preemption on its head and will bring about needless 
confusion in our jurisprudence as to the proper preemption 
analysis.  I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 
  
  
 
 
